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1. INTRODUCTION
Credibility is commonly defined as the ability of monetary authorities to manage 
inflationary expectations. Theoretical considerations lead to the conclusion that if 
the inflation expectations of economic agents are high, the process of disinflation 
tends to be longer and more costly in terms of output loss. Hence, a central bank 
(CB) that can manage inflation expectations should be able to conduct a more 
effective monetary policy. However, this theoretical claim has proved to be diffi-
cult to verify empirically because credibility is a qualitative concept, which does 
not lend itself readily to measuring. The present study proposes a comprehensive 
index of CB credibility with the aim to facilitate empirical work in that area.
To date, empirical studies attempting to measure CB credibility have relied on 
one of two approaches: either a quantification of credibility determinants (cred-
ibility creation approach) or a quantification of credibility effects (credibility im-
pact approach). The first method selects and quantifies a factor that, according to 
a commonly accepted view, influences CB credibility. For instance, in a number 
of studies, CB independence was used as a proxy of credibility. However, such 
a measure may not be fully reliable because credibility, as a multidimensional 
phenomenon, may be influenced by many other determinants. Moreover, char-
acteristics such as independence are relatively stable, in contrast to credibility, 
which is considered to change gradually over time. 
According to the second approach, CB credibility is measured on the basis of 
variables which are influenced by credibility. These variables include inflation-
ary expectations and long-term interest rates. For some countries, especially less 
developed and transition economies, problems may arise with the availability of 
data. To obtain reliable data on long-term interest rates, well-developed financial 
markets are needed, a condition that is not fulfilled in many countries. As far as 
inflationary expectations are concerned, a possible heterogeneity of the expecta-
tions of various groups of economic agents results in the need to make a decision 
on whose expectations to analyse in this context.  
This study makes use of the first of these approaches, the credibility creation 
approach, and encompasses the main determinants of CB credibility. The remain-
der of the paper examines the components of the credibility index in detail, and 
is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature investi-
gating the determinants of CB credibility. Section 3 describes the detailed struc-
ture of the credibility index; Section 4 presents compiled index values for the 9 
countries covered by the study and then proceeds to compare the obtained results 
(developed indices) with credibility measures that, by contrast, use the credibility 
impact approach. Finally, the last section offers some conclusions.
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2. DETERMINANTS OF CENTRAL BANK CREDIBILITY
The construction of the credibility index is based on the quantification of the 
main determinants of the CB credibility. In this study, results of a widely cited 
survey conducted by Blinder (2000) constituted a starting point. Respondents 
were invited to provide their opinions on how a CB can build or create cred-
ibility. Respondents indicated a history of honesty (a history of living up to its 
word), independence, and a history of fighting inflation as the most significant 
features. A not much lower score was assigned to the transparency of monetary 
policy and a small fiscal deficit or debt. However, some factors that the theo-
retical literature and empirical studies consider important were omitted from the 
survey. Aiming to amend that, the present paper addresses an additional factor: 
the accountability of a CB. 
The transparency of monetary policy is regarded as a matter of great impor-
tance in the literature and in the practice of modern central banking, in particular 
in the inflation targeting framework. The relationship between transparency and 
credibility was discussed in several important articles, including Cukierman – 
Meltzer (1986), Faust – Svensson (2001), Geraats (2001) and Jensen (2002). The 
general conclusion is that a higher degree of transparency is beneficial for CB 
credibility. Transparency makes it easier for the private sector to infer the true 
intentions of the monetary policymakers. As such, transparency makes the ex-
pectations of the economic agents more sensitive to actions of the CB. Hence, 
a CB that cares about its reputation becomes less willing to create inflationary 
surprises. Lately, Vayid (2013) interpreted forward guidance as a link between 
CB communication and credibility. Forward guidance is used by CBs as a tool for 
managing the expectations of financial markets and the public. 
The empirical verification of the relationship suggested by the theoretical lit-
erature is difficult, because both concepts – transparency and credibility – are 
difficult to measure. However, the creation of some transparency indices (e.g. 
Fry et al. 2000; Chortareas et al. 2002; Eijffinger – Geraats 2006) enabled studies 
concerning the relationship between transparency and other macroeconomic vari-
ables. A link between transparency and credibility is suggested by several studies, 
including Cecchetti – Krause (2002), Levin et al. (2004), van der Cruisen – De-
mertzis (2005), Geraats et al. (2006), and Gürkaynak et al. (2006).  
The second feature, independence, is commonly regarded as one of the most 
important conditions for a CB to be credible. Debate on this issue was initiated by 
Rogoff (1985). According to Rogoff’s model, the appointment of an independent, 
conservative central banker should lead to a reduced inflation bias. The benefi-
cial role played by independence was evidenced by Alesina – Summers (1993), 
de Haan – Kooi (1997), and Eijffinger et al. (1998). However, Fuhrer (1997) 
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found no evidence for the “credibility bonus” of the independent CB. No relation-
ship between independence and credibility was found by Posen (1998) either. In 
his famous study, he tested several hypotheses that could be empirically verified 
and found no evidence that greater independence leads to greater credibility. 
Recently, the global financial crisis caused increased interest in linkage be-
tween CB independence and credibility. For example, Blinder (2012) claims that 
in a crisis, CB independence is neither possible nor desirable, and what is needed 
is coordination between monetary and fiscal authorities. On the other hand, Borrio 
(2011) underlines the need for stronger operational independence to ensure the 
ability of CBs to fulfil their tasks in post-crisis times. Despite some controver-
sies concerning the relationship between CB independence and CB credibility, it 
seems to be a commonly accepted view in macroeconomics that independence is 
an important condition for CBs to be credible to economic agents. Consequently, 
independence has been included as a component of the credibility index.
CB transparency and independence are inseparably connected with CB ac-
countability. While academic considerations regarding accountability focus 
mainly on the role of institutions in democratic societies, they also lead to ques-
tions about a possible impact of accountability on monetary policy outcomes and 
credibility of monetary policymakers. If monetary policy is conducted by an in-
dependent institution that is chaired by individuals who have not been elected in 
a democratic manner, such persons should be held accountable for their actions. 
Hence, accountability may be viewed as an important factor improving the qual-
ity of monetary policymaking. Accountability may be analysed in the following 
three aspects: (1) decisions about the explicit definition and ranking of objectives 
of monetary policy, (2) transparency of actual monetary policy, and (3) question 
of who bears final responsibility with respect to monetary policy, with transpar-
ency discussed separately in this study.
With respect to the third aspect of accountability, the final responsibility for 
monetary policy, Eijffinger – Hoeberichts (2002) show that if the final responsi-
bility shifts in the direction of the government, inflationary expectations increase. 
As a result, the credibility of monetary policy is lower. Nevertheless, it seems 
to be generally agreed that to legitimise the central banks’ actions, some kind 
of democratic control over the CB should be established. Most commonly, such 
control is implemented through the requirement to report or explain policy ac-
tions to the Parliament or the government, but it is also possible to employ some 
forms of overriding mechanisms or dismissal procedures for the CB governor.
A history of honesty has been interpreted in this paper as the conducted policy 
being in accordance with the announced goals of monetary policy. This is the 
most intuitive way of gaining credibility. If the CB sets inflation targets, to pursue 
and achieve them in a consistent manner is but a natural way leading to anchoring 
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inflationary expectations in the inflation target. Empirical studies confirm that 
the announcement of an inflation target helps anchor inflation expectations at de-
sired level (e.g. Demertzis et al. 2009). A history of honesty has been ranked first 
by both central bankers and academics in Blinder’s survey concerning ways of 
building credibility. Another factor ranked high in that survey, the history of fight-
ing inflation, may seem very close to a history of having successfully achieved 
inflation targets. In practice, in many countries it may be virtually the same, but 
conceptually these two issues should be distinguished. The importance of low 
past inflation for building credibility is stressed in the early theoretical literature. 
Past inflation record is the key issue in reputation models (e.g. Barro – Gordon 
1983; Backus – Driffil 1985).1 
The credibility determinants discussed above are directly connected with the 
institutional arrangements concerning the CB, or related to the way in which 
monetary policy is conducted. Still, there may be other factors that influence the 
credibility of monetary policy, but they are beyond the CB’s direct control. One 
such factor has been included in the study: public debt. Fiscal policy stance was 
indicated as one of the determinants of credibility in the Blinder’s survey. There 
is ample literature investigating the link between public debt and inflation, fol-
lowing the discussion initiated by the famous “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic” 
by Sargent – Wallace (1981) and followed by the fiscal theory of the price level 
(Woodford 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2001; Leeper 1991; Sims 1994; Cochrane 
2000, 2001). The authors demonstrate that in the environment marked by fiscal 
dominance and high public debt, the monetary authorities eventually lose control 
over inflation. Inflationary pressures caused by high debt undermine the credibil-
ity of monetary policy. On the other hand, Reinhart – Sack (2000) argue that low 
public debt should help keep inflation expectations low.
More recently, the issue of credibility has been discussed in the context of 
monetary policy after the global financial crisis. Until then, the common wis-
dom said that the best what CBs could do for the economy was to maintain price 
stability. Now it seems that there is no consensus on what CBs can and should 
achieve. Practitioners and theorists of monetary policy realised that price stabil-
ity is not sufficient to guarantee economic and financial stability. Borrio (2011) 
writes about the “paradox of credibility”, arguing that low and stable prices and 
high level of CB credibility (reflected in low and stable inflationary expecta-
tions) made it harder to recognise increasing disequilibrium in the economy 
because it did not show up in rising inflation, but in increasing credit and asset 
1  The importance of the past inflation record is especially visible for EMU countries with one 
central bank pursuing the same inflation target. Cruisen – Demertzis (2011) show that for 
some EMU countries, their inflation experiences still affect national inflation expectations.
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prices. Moreover, the unconventional measures used by CBs after the outburst 
of the global financial crisis (quantitative easing and credit easing) and the reo-
rientation in monetary policy made the public unsure of what the true goals of 
CBs were and what the outcomes of such policies would be. Monetary policy-
makers realise that and try to manage the markets and the public expectations 
using, for example, forward guidance. Increased openness and communication 
should also help economic agents infer the true priorities of CBs. On the other 
hand, a complicated picture of modern monetary policy makes it harder to assess 
CB credibility.
3. THE INDEX FOR CENTRAL BANK CREDIBILITY
The suggested credibility index consists of 6 sub-indices and each sub-index is 
based on one of the determinants of credibility described in the previous section. 
Each of the composite factors has been quantified in such a manner that it ranges 
from 0 (no credibility) to 100 (full credibility). 
3.1. Achievement of announced monetary policy targets
In Blinder’s survey, respondents identified a history of “doing what the central 
bank said it would do” as the main factor contributing to the CB’s credibility. In 
cases where publicly announced monetary policy targets exist, this factor may be 
assessed by the degree to which the targets have been achieved. In this study, the 
assessment has been twofold: as the scope of time in which the target variable 
(inflation) remained within the announced target boundaries, and as the size of 
deviations of inflation from the target.
The reason for assessing the meeting of targets in such a way is that CBs may 
set inflation targets in various manners. Naturally, in terms of credibility, it is 
important how often the CB has achieved its targets. But it also seems to matter 
for credibility whether inflation targets were missed with a wide target range (e.g. 
in Brazil) or with a point target (initially in Chile). Moreover, it is rather larger 
deviations of inflation from the target than smaller ones that are likely to have a 
greater impact on credibility.
The scope of time in which inflation targets were met is expressed as the 
percentage of months in the year in which inflation remained within the target 
bounds. In cases where there were only short-term inflation targets set for the end 
of subsequent years, the targets have been interpolated to obtain target values for 
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each month.2 If the short-term targets were subject to change during a year, 25% 
of the index value has been subtracted in order for a possible negative impact of 
such occurrences on CB credibility to be taken into account.3 
The second element in the assessment of accuracy in hitting inflation targets 
is the size of deviations of inflation from the target. To be incorporated in the 
credibility index, the deviations are transformed with the use of the following 
formula:
  (1)
where inf stands for inflation and tar for the target set for the corresponding pe-
riod.4 
The transformation is designed in such a way that for inflation on the target level, 
the sub-index amounts to 100, which is the maximum value. When the deviations 
of inflation from the target increase, the function converges non-linearly to 0.5 
The two discussed elements taken into account while assessing the realisation 
of the targets by CBs are included with equal weights. Hence, the first part of the 
credibility index may be presented as the following function:
 1 0.5
1000.5 (% ) 0.5 inf tarCI of time e 
     (2)
2  With regard to the variety of solutions within the inflation targeting framework in various coun-
tries, the method of calculating the index has been adapted to these individual solutions. For 
instance, in Chile point inflation targets have been set for some years. In this study, the target 
was considered to be met if inflation did not deviate from the target by more than +/– 0.2 p.p. 
In Turkey, for most of the period under consideration, the target was unsymmetrical, so the 
target was considered to be met if inflation was below target. In Slovakia, targets were set for 
several inflation indices: CPI for the end of the year, yearly average CPI and net inflation. In 
order to obtain monthly targets, the following transformation has been adopted: tari = ai2 + bi 
+ c, where c = tar0 and 
12
1
1
1
12 ii
tar tar

  (where tari – target for the ith month of year, tar0 – target for 
the end of the previous year, and tar12 – target for the average yearly inflation ).
3  This was the case in Slovakia in 2000, in Poland in 1999 and 2002, and in Brazil in 2003 (infla-
tion target changes).
4  A similar formula was used by Kia – Patron (2004) to measure the transparency of the US 
monetary policy.
5  In the case of Hungary, the deviations from the target were calculated only for inflation targets, 
although the scope of time, when policy targets were met, was calculated for inflation being 
within the target band as well as the exchange rate being within the exchange rate band (with 
weights equal to 0.5). The first inflation target was set for 2001 r. However, in previous years, 
the exchange rate policy (maintaining the exchange rate band) was shaped in such a manner 
as to achieve a preferred inflation rate. In this study, it has been assumed that this preferred 
inflation rate was the inflation rate foreseen in the budget plan. These values were used for 
calculation for the years in which no explicit inflation targets were set (1999, 2000).
0.5
100
inf tare 
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3.2. Past infl ation performance
The past inflation record is undoubtedly one of the most important factors that in-
fluence CB credibility. Monetary authorities who are capable of conducting dis-
inflation successfully or of stabilising inflation at low levels will probably enjoy 
higher credibility. Nevertheless, inflation is driven not only by domestic factors. 
Therefore, to allow for price changes on the global markets without affecting the 
credibility index, past inflation rates have been expressed in the index in relation 
to inflation in advanced economies, where inflation is relatively low and stable.6 
Thus, the second sub-index of the credibility measure has the following form:
  (3)
where: tπ denotes the average inflation in a given country during the past three 
years and develtπ the average inflation rate in advanced economies during the past 
three years. 
The sub-index CI2 amounts to 0 if the average inflation during past three years 
exceeded 20%, and to 100 if the average inflation was lower than average infla-
tion during the past three years in developed countries. In other cases, the cred-
ibility negatively depends on the difference between average past inflation in the 
given country and average past inflation in advanced countries. At the same time, 
it is assumed that a higher rate in the average inflation in advanced economies 
will result in a stronger impact of the inflation difference on credibility.7
6  According to the classification of the IMF. Data on the average inflation rate in advanced 
economies from the World Economic Outlook of the IMF were used for the compilation of the 
sub-index.
7  A function of this form designed to assess CB credibility was used by Cecchetti – Krause 
(2000). In their study, inflation expectations were used instead of country-specific past infla-
tion, while the inflation target was used in place of past inflation in developed countries. They 
also assumed that with inflation expectations higher than 20%, the CB has no credibility.The 
authors assumed that inflation expectations were equal to average inflation during the past 
5 years. Hence, in this study, a threshold of 20% average inflation was also assumed, above 
which the central bank has no credibility. Of course, this assumption is arbitrary, but it seems 
consistent with intuition.
2
0 20%
100100 ( ) 20%
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t
devel
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 3.3. Transparency of monetary policy
Transparency has become a focal point for inflation targeting strategies imple-
mented by a considerable number of CBs. It is a qualitative characteristic, and 
thus one which is not easy to measure. In this study, transparency is quantified 
with the use of the index proposed by Fry et al. (2000). It is a comprehensive in-
dex, capturing all important aspects of transparency. Moreover, the same authors 
invented also the independence and accountability indices used in this study, the 
implication being that these measures should be relatively consistent.
For the aims of this study, separate transparency indices have been compiled 
for each country on an annual basis. Hence, the third component of the credibility 
index is rendered as follows: 
 CI3 = transparency index8  (4)
3.4. Central bank independence
According to the view prevalent in the economic literature, CB independence is 
another characteristic that has profound effects on credibility. As is the case with 
transparency, independence has been quantified using the method developed by 
Fry et al. (2000). 
 CI4 = independence index  (5)
The independence index proved much more stable than the transparency index, 
for most countries in the sample guaranteed the CBs formal independence before 
1999. It should be noted that the independence index measures the independence 
de jure, while there might be some more significant changes in the independence 
de facto. The independence de facto is much more difficult to measure, so the most 
known and widely used independence indices measure the independence de jure.
3.5. Central bank accountability
The feature that is strongly linked to the CB’s transparency and independence is 
the bank’s accountability. The reason for implementing means to enhance trans-
parency and accountability is the widespread belief that independent institutions 
in democratic societies need some form of democratic control. 
8  In the study, the same weights and scores are used as in the original questionnaire by Fry et al. 
(2000). The weights of each question and the scores attached to each answer in the question-
naire are not explicitly explained by the authors.
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As already mentioned, CB accountability is quantified with the use of the ac-
countability index constructed by Fry et al. (2000). However, the original index 
has been modified slightly, since there was one area in which it was found to 
overlap with the independence index. Specifically, both the independence index 
and the original accountability index intended to capture the role of the govern-
ment in setting the inflation target. The government’s participation in deciding 
the inflation target lowers independence but increases accountability. It may be 
argued that CB credibility, particularly in less developed countries, tends to be 
enhanced when it is only the CB that sets inflation targets. Consequently, the 
accountability index has been modified to remove that issue from the scope of 
the index. 
 CI5 = accountability index   (6)
 3.6. Public debt
The last component of the credibility index is a sub-index for public debt. As al-
ready pointed out, the larger the public debt, the higher the expectations for future 
inflation, or, in other words, the lower the perceived ability of the CB to control 
inflation, resulting in losing some of its credibility. Since credibility is negatively 
correlated to the value of the public debt figure, the following formula is used 
to secure the relationship and transform it in such a way that the sub-index falls 
within the range from 0 to 100:
  (7)
where debt stands for the general government debt.
While designing the sub-index, it was assumed that a level of public debt 
lower than 60% of GDP does not harm the CB’s credibility (this is the maxi-
mum level of public debt to GDP ratio that is considered to be “safe” and not to 
undermine the ability of common CB to maintain price stability in the Stability 
and Growth Pact). In contrast, a level of public debt higher than 100% of GDP 
6
0 100 100
10100 (1 ) 60 100 100
4
100 100 60
debtif
GDP
debt debtCI if
GDP GDP
debtif
GDP
          
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is assumed to be so significant that the sub-index is equal to zero.9 For the pub-
lic debt in ranges from 60% to 100% of GDP, the credibility depends linearly 
on debt.
3.7. The weights
The credibility index presented in this study consists of six sub-indices. However, 
the six determinants of credibility reflected by the sub-indices may influence 
credibility with different strength. Hence, the weights on respective sub-indices 
have been differentiated accordingly. The strength with which the particular at-
tribute affects credibility has been proxied by the average score of the attribute 
given by the respondents in Blinder’s survey. The scores given by economists 
have been adopted as a basic variant. The weight of each sub-index is the relation 
of the average score of the given factor to the sum of the average scores of all 
factors considered. Since Blinder’s survey fails to include CB accountability, an 
assumption has been made that the weight of accountability is equal to the weight 
of the transparency of monetary policy. All the weights sum up to unity.
 CI = 0.19 ∙ CI1 + 0.17 ∙ CI2 + 0.155 ∙ CI2 + 0.18 ∙ CI4 + 0.155 ∙ CI5 + 
 + 0.15 ∙ CI6 10 (8)
4. CREDIBILITY INDEX – RESULTS
We attempted to quantify the credibility of CBs in four CEE countries – the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia as an illustration of the proposed meas-
ure of credibility. All these countries adopted inflation targeting (IT) as a frame-
9  There are no precise estimates on what level of public debt may cause fiscal dominance and 
lead to the situation in which the price level will have to adjust in order to satisfy the govern-
ment’s intertemporal budget constraint. In this study, the perception of the public is regarded 
as important – what level of debt people would consider “too high” and potentially dangerous. 
It is more probable that the public will notice change in the level of public debt from 99% of 
GDP to 100% of GDP than from 89% of GDP to 90% of GDP. For this reason, the value of 
100% of GDP has been assumed for the aims of the study.
10  In order to check the sensitivity of the index to a change of the weight system, four alterna-
tive weight systems have been adopted. The ranking of the countries according to the average 
credibility index in the period 1999–2007 is the same in three out of four variants (including 
the basic variant). A more detailed analysis (not reported in this paper) proved that the index 
is sensitive to a change of weights only to a very limited extent. The analysis is available from 
the author upon request.
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work for monetary policy during the transition period with the goal of stabilising 
inflation and inflation expectations, and it seems that this framework proved to 
be quite successful. For comparison, we also computed the values of the index for 
three emerging economies: Brazil, Chile and Turkey, and two advanced econo-
mies, Sweden and the UK. All these countries also used IT as a framework in 
monetary policy.11
A variety of data is needed for the compilation of the credibility index. Trans-
parency, independence, and accountability were quantified on the basis of Fry et 
al. (2000) and central banks’ documents, publications, and information available 
on the central banks’ websites. Central banks’ websites are also sources of data on 
inflation targets. The source of data on inflation rates are countries’ statistical of-
fices, and the average inflation rate in advanced economies used for computation 
of the past-inflation sub-index comes from the IMF World Economic Outlook 
database. Data on general government debt to GDP ratio in European countries 
and Turkey12 comes from Eurostat, for Brazil from the Central Bank of Brazil, 
and for Chile from the Direccion de Presupuestos (DIPRES).
The results of the compiled credibility index for the nine countries in the pe-
riod 1999–2007 are presented in Table 1 in Appendix 1. The sample ends in 2007, 
so it does not include the financial crisis period. The reason for this was to dem-
onstrate the performance of the credibility index in “normal” times, given the 
lack of consensus on monetary policy in the post-crisis period in terms of its goals 
(price stability vs. financial stability) and instruments, as described in Section 2. 
In this situation, the comparison of the credibility index with other credibility 
measures – as presented below – may be misleading.13 
On the basis of the results it may be stated that the credibility expressed by 
the credibility index generally increased in the period under consideration in the 
analysed countries. The most significant change between the year 1999 and 2007 
was recorded for the Central Bank of Turkey, whereas the most stable index val-
ues were noted for the Bank of England. Mainly three factors contributed to the 
overall increase in the credibility index: past inflation, effectiveness in hitting 
inflation targets, and transparency of monetary policy. These changes reflect the 
success of inflation targeting in these countries, as the CBs were able to control 
inflation better and be more precise in hitting inflation targets. 
11  The reason for choosing only inflation targeters for the study was to cross-check the results 
with credibility measures based on inflation expectations and inflation targets.
12  For Turkey, the time series begins in 2000, so the value for 1999 comes from the IMF.
13  Another point is, as Blinder (2012) argues, that building central bank credibility in a crisis may 
require different actions than in normal times; for example, providing low inflation may not be 
a condition for the central bank to be credible.
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A significant increase could be noted in the transparency of monetary policy 
in the analysed countries. All the CBs in the sample improved their transparency 
in this period. The most considerable improvement was achieved in the aspect 
of transparency concerning the publication of macroeconomic forecast and for-
ward-looking analyses. 
The other factors changed to a considerably lesser extent. CB independence 
did not change much because by 1999, most of the CBs in the sample had al-
ready implemented the most important reforms in this field. None of the CBs 
had full independence according to the independence index, yet they had a high 
degree of independence. In 2007, the Central Bank of Brazil was least independ-
ent, whereas the Riskbank in Sweden was most independent. Also, the National 
Bank of Poland, the Czech National Bank, and the National Bank of Slovakia 
were granted a high degree of formal independence. 
Accountability was the factor that was least variable during the analysed pe-
riod. All the CBs announced numerical policy targets and all were subject to 
some form of parliamentary or governmental monitoring. The only difference 
between the countries could be noticed in the existence of formal procedures to 
be executed if targets were missed. Such procedures existed in Brazil, Sweden, 
Turkey, and the UK. Also, only slight changes were noted in the factor exogenous 
to monetary policy, namely public debt. During the sample period, the analysed 
countries were not heavily indebted, with public debt to GDP ratio below 60% 
of GDP in most of them. At the end of the sample period, the public debt was 
higher than 60% of GDP only in Hungary.
4.1. Comparison with other measures of central bank credibility
In the introduction, we referred to the credibility measures based on long-term 
interest rates or the inflation expectations of economic agents. As the concept 
of credibility refers to the public’s beliefs about the CB willingness or ability to 
pursue the certain policy, these measures seem to be a natural choice when ana-
lysing credibility. Moreover, some of them have the advantage that they allow 
for observing the gradual evolution of credibility in time. For example, Goldberg 
– Klein (2011) study the credibility of the European Central Bank by analysing 
changes of the effects of news announcements on the yield curve for euro area 
countries, using hourly data. However, the use of such measures is limited due to 
the availability and quality of data, especially for the less developed economies.
In order to check the correctness of the proposed index, the obtained values 
of the credibility index have been compared to results obtained using credibil-
ity measures based on the inflation expectations of economic agents. Credibility 
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measures based on inflation expectations are calculated with the use of a quite 
different set of variables from those employed in the proposed credibility index, 
so it seemed interesting to compare their results. Two measures based on inflation 
expectations suggested in the theoretical literature have been calculated: the de-
viations of inflation expectations from the inflation target (e.g. Faust – Svensson 
2001), and the weight of the inflation target in the formation of inflation expecta-
tions (e.g. Bomfim – Rudebusch 2000).
Inflation expectations may be different depending on the analysed group of 
agents. For this reason, the above-mentioned measures have been calculated for 
two groups of agents: financial analysts and consumers. However, the data are 
not homogeneous for all the countries, so it complicates conclusions to some 
extent. Moreover, the data on consumer inflation expectations were not avail-
able for some countries (including Brazil, Chile, and Turkey in this study). Data 
source of financial analysts’ expectations are the countries’ central banks (Brazil, 
Chile, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Sweden, Turkey, and the UK) and Reuters 
(the Czech Republic for net inflation, Hungary, and Poland). The data is monthly, 
with the exception of Sweden and the UK, which are quarterly. Data on consum-
ers’ inflation expectations in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and the UK 
come from the European Commission Consumer Survey and were quantified by 
Łyziak – Stanisławska (2008), for Poland the data source is NBP, and for Sweden 
it is the National Institute of Economic Research. All the data is monthly.
4.1.1. The credibility index and the deviations of inflation expectations from the 
inflation target
The comparison of the credibility index and the deviations of inflation expecta-
tions from the inflation target is based on correlations between these two cred-
ibility measures. Since the number of observations was low for the respective 
countries, the correlations have been calculated jointly for all the countries. The 
deviations of inflation expectations from the inflation target may be computed in 
several ways. In this study, the following deviation measures have been used: 
 the absolute deviations of inflation expectations from the inflation target 
(yearly average) – as the simplest credibility measure, consistent with defi-
nition of credibility,
 the absolute deviations of inflation expectations from the inflation target 
relative to the target (yearly average) – a measure used to facilitate the com-
parison between individual countries,
 the absolute deviations of inflation expectations, smoothed by the Hodrick-
Prescott filter, from the inflation target (yearly average) – a measure used 
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because in the case of a few countries, only short-term inflation expectations 
were available, which may be sensitive to transitory shocks,
 the absolute deviations of inflation expectations, smoothed by the Hodrick-
Prescott filter, from the inflation target relative to the target (yearly average).
All the deviations have been calculated from the centre of the target range.
Table 1 presents the correlation of the credibility index with all the above-
listed measures of deviations of the inflation expectations of two groups of agents 
from the inflation target. The study considered only inflation targets that were 
known at the time of forming the inflation expectations and that were set for the 
time horizon for which the expectations were formed. 
The results show that the correlation between the credibility index and the 
deviations of inflation expectations from the inflation target is strong, negative, 
and statistically significant. It should be noted that the correlation is stronger in 
the case of the expectations of financial analysts than it is in the case of consumer 
expectations. However, all the results obtained confirm a significant relationship. 
The smaller the deviations of inflation expectations from the inflation target, in-
Table 1. Correlations of the credibility index with respective measures of deviations of inflation 
expectations from the inflation target
Deviation 
measure
Group of agents
Analysts Consumers
Dev. –0.61*** –0.61***
Prob. 0.00 0.00
Dev./tar. –0.54*** –0.39***
Prob. 0.00 0.01
Dev. HP –0.66*** –0.50***
Prob. 0.00 0.00
Dev. HP/tar –0.60*** –0.23
Prob. 0.00 0.10
Number of observations 72 51
Note: In the case of consumers, only data for European countries from the sample were available, so the number 
of observations is lower.
Dev. – absolute deviations of inflation expectations from the inflation target, Dev./tar. – absolute deviations of 
inflation expectations from the inflation target relative to the target, Dev. HP – absolute deviations of inflation 
expectations, smoothed by the Hodrick-Prescott filter, from the inflation target, Dev. HP/tar. – absolute devia-
tions of inflation expectations, smoothed by the Hodrick-Prescott filter, from the inflation target relative to the 
target; *** significant at the 1% level.
Source: Own calculations.
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dicating higher credibility, the higher the credibility index.14 The results suggest 
that the analysed credibility measures are consistent.
4.1.2. The credibility index and the weight attached to the inflation target in the 
formation of inflation expectations by economic agents
The theoretical considerations suggest that the higher the CB credibility, the more 
the economic agents should be convinced that the announced inflation target 
would be met. Consequently, the weight of the inflation target in forming infla-
tion expectations should be higher. In order to assess the weight of the inflation 
target, the following equations of inflation expectations have been estimated:
                                                                          15 (9)
where |
e
T tπ  stands for inflation expectations formed at time t for period T, tarTπ  – 
inflation target for period T, known at the moment of forming expectations, 0tπ  – inflation rate known at time t, gapt–2 – unemployment gap at time t–216, and Δet 
– nominal exchange rate percentage change.17
  (10)
As in the previous case, the inflation expectations of the two groups of agents, 
financial analysts and consumers, have been used. In this case, the credibility 
14  In order to verify the robustness of the results, apart from the Pearson correlation coefficient 
(which assumes the linear relationship), the Spearman rank correlation coefficient has been 
calculated (not reported in this paper). The results for the financial analysts’ expectations were 
very similar to those obtained in the case of the Pearson correlation. The Spearman rank cor-
relation was lower than the Pearson correlation in the case of consumer inflation expectations, 
but was still quite high. 
15  Such specification of inflation expectations equation was used for Brazil by Bevilaqua et al. 
(2007).
16  The unemployment gap was calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Only in the case of 
Brazil was the equation estimated with the output gap because of the lack of consistent data for 
unemployment in the whole period. The output gap was calculated by filtering the output data 
with the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The data source for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia, Sweden, and the UK is Eurostat, for Brazil, Chile and Turkey, the countries’ statisti-
cal offices.
17  In order to avoid excessive volatility, the nominal exchange rate percentage change during 6 
months has been calculated. In the case of European countries (except for the UK), the ex-
change rate of euro to domestic currency was used, while in the case of the remaining countries 
the US dollar exchange rate. 
0
| 1 2 3 2 4
e tar
T t T t t ta a a gap a eπ π π Δ       
  0| 1e tarT t T tπ λ π λ π    
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measure to be compared with the credibility index is the coefficient on the infla-
tion target in estimated equations. An increase in the coefficient value can be 
interpreted as an increase in credibility. Additionally, the coefficient on past infla-
tion may be observed. A decrease in the coefficient value indicates that the expec-
tations become less adaptive, which may also be a sign of higher credibility. 
In order to allow for a change in the coefficients, the equations have been es-
timated using the 36-month rolling window regressions. The exemplary results 
are presented below:18
1. Results of estimation of equation (9)
18  The figures represent an estimated coefficient and a band of +/–2 S.E. The coefficient on the 
inflation target is compared to the credibility index in the corresponding time period. The rest 
of the results – coefficients on inflation targets in equations (9) and (10) – are presented in the 
tables in Appendix 2. All remaining figures, including coefficients on past inflation in inflation 
expectations equations, are available upon request from the author.
Figure 2. Coefficient on the inflation target in the equation of analysts’ 
inflation expectations in the Czech Republic
Figure 1. Coefficient on the inflation target in the equation of analysts’ 
inflation expectations in Brazil
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2. Results of estimation of equation (10)
Our obtained results lead to two important conclusions. Firstly, there are 
noticeable differences between the inflation expectations of the two groups of 
economic agents: financial analysts and consumers. In those countries where it 
was possible to obtain comparable data on the inflation expectations of financial 
analysts and consumers, the weight of the inflation target in forming inflation ex-
pectations was notably higher in the case of financial analysts than in the case of 
consumers. Consumers were backward-looking to a considerably higher degree 
and attached a higher weight to past inflation while forming inflation expecta-
tions. Hence, it may be concluded that the belief that the CBs would meet their 
inflation targets was very strong among financial analysts and very weak among 
consumers (with the exception of the Swedish consumers). Secondly, it seems 
Figure 4. Coefficient on the inflation target in the equation of analysts’ 
inflation expectations in the Czech Republic
Figure 3. Coefficient on inflation target in equation of analysts’ 
inflation expectations in Brazil
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that the two compared credibility measures, namely the credibility index and the 
weight of the inflation target in forming the inflation expectations, are consistent 
to a considerable extent. However, it should be mentioned that the comparison 
has focused on the direction of changes rather than on the levels of the compared 
variables. Of course, it is very easy to show opposite cases: in the case of Turkey, 
for example, the coefficient on inflation expectations in equation (9) falls, while 
the credibility index increases, or in the case of the UK, the coefficient in equa-
tion (9) also falls, while the index does not change. However, the number of such 
cases is rather small and it seems that the credibility index reflects the credibility 
changes suggested by the changes in the weights of the inflation target in forming 
inflation expectations, in particular when the financial analysts’ expectations are 
taken into account. 
The findings obtained in this study lead to the conclusion that the credibility 
index and the credibility measures based on the inflation expectations of econom-
ic agents are to a large extent consistent and give a similar picture of CB cred-
ibility. It should be stressed that the credibility index is a measure based on the 
credibility creation approach, while the other measures (the deviations of infla-
tion expectations from the inflation target and the weight attached to the inflation 
target while forming inflation expectations) are based on the credibility impact 
approach, so the set of variables used to calculate these measures is entirely dif-
ferent. Taking this into account, it may be stated that the similarities in the results 
obtained using both the credibility index and the other two credibility measures 
are sufficient to consider the credibility index to be an appropriate measure of CB 
credibility. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
The results suggest that the credibility index is a relevant and consistent credibil-
ity measure. It offers the advantages of being fully comparable between countries 
and of being time-variant, features that designate it as a suitable instrument in 
studies that attempt to investigate the macroeconomic effects of CB credibility. 
The index is also well-founded on theoretical grounds besides being based on the 
findings of existing empirical studies. Although it may not be treated as a very 
precise credibility measure, it may be useful for countries where there are no 
reliable data on inflation expectations or long-term interest rates. As this study 
shows, the index may be to some extent a substitute for credibility measures 
based on inflation expectations. The use of the credibility index suggests that the 
CBs from the sample increased their credibility in the period 1999–2007, espe-
cially in the countries where credibility had been low. 
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The credibility measure can be used in empirical studies to verify the hypothe-
ses with respect to the credibility of monetary policy formulated in the theoretical 
literature. Specifically, it is postulated that CB credibility plays a prominent role 
in macroeconomic processes: it enhances the effectiveness with which monetary 
policy goals are achieved, reduces disinflation costs, or reduces the trade-off be-
tween the inflation volatility and output volatility. To verify these theoretical con-
ceptions empirically might be a viable direction for further research. Moreover, 
as the credibility index seems to be consistent with other credibility measures 
based on inflation expectations in “normal” times, the study may be extended for 
the financial crisis period in order to check whether both types of measures are 
still consistent with each other or whether they tell us different stories about CB 
credibility.
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APPENDIX 1
Values of the credibility index
B
ra
zi
l 
C
hi
le
 
C
R
 
H
un
ga
ry
 
Po
la
nd
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Sw
ed
en
 
Tu
rk
ey
 
U
K
1999
1. Target 
realisation
% time in 
target 33.33 0.00 0.00 100.00 6.25 16.67 16.67 41.67 100.00
Dev. 
from 
target
20.77 61.69 8.36 77.88 40.71 54.08 47.38 47.40 87.65
2. Past inflation 63.17 76.48 59.26 7.00 24.81 76.67 100.00 0.00 100.00
3. Transparency 73.31 79.70 81.72 41.79 65.84 62.69 94.97 33.33 94.34
4. Independence 62.62 82.08 86.23 82.38 86.23 85.15 97.77 69.77 77.46
5. Accountability 100.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 100.00 37.50 100.00
6. Public debt 100.00 100.00 100.00 98.00 100.00 100.00 89.25 97.50 100.00
INDEX 69.01 72.61 65.68 65.72 61.03 71.42 84.29 46.62 93.89
2000
1. Target 
realisation
% time in 
target 91.67 25.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 6.25 41.67 0.00 100.00
Dev. 
from 
target
58.96 73.87 41.25 19.20 18.44 36.65 57.76 0.02 80.99
2. Past inflation 81.84 82.36 70.36 31.65 47.27 66.55 100.00 0.00 100.00
3. Transparency 77.71 90.68 74.94 52.48 65.84 64.97 100.00 31.07 98.11
4. Independence 62.62 82.08 86.23 82.38 93.92 85.15 97.77 69.77 77.46
5. Accountability 100.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 100.00 37.50 100.00
6. Public debt 99.22 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INDEX 81.82 78.85 69.64 66.29 63.52 67.41 90.04 38.19 93.84
2001
1. Target 
realisation
% time in 
target 66.67 91.67 66.67 100.00 41.67 33.33 100.00 0.00 100.00
Dev. 
from 
target
24.23 74.19 69.48 82.02 55.66 64.83 72.56 0.07 82.79
2. Past inflation 81.78 86.89 78.87 47.27 56.10 55.92 100.00 0.00 100.00
3. Transparency 84.37 93.83 74.94 67.28 70.24 68.00 100.00 39.03 98.11
4. Independence 62.62 82.08 86.23 86.23 93.92 92.85 97.77 85.15 77.46
5. Accountability 100.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
6. Public debt 87.67 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 55.25 100.00
INDEX 75.54 86.47 80.10 77.90 73.20 72.71 96.99 45.17 94.02
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Table continued
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U
K
2002
1. Target 
realisation
% time in 
target 0.00 100.00 33.33 100.00 0.00 8.33 100.00 16.67 100.00
Dev. 
from 
target
8.52 78.24 44.65 79.32 19.30 57.18 86.65 19.51 82.85
2. Past inflation 75.98 90.61 90.79 57.13 68.32 55.80 100.00 0.00 100.00
3. Transparency 84.37 92.25 74.94 70.31 74.77 75.43 100.00 78.19 98.11
4. Independence 62.62 82.08 93.92 86.23 93.92 92.85 97.77 85.15 77.46
5. Accountability 100.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
6. Public debt 87.79 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 65.00 100.00
INDEX 66.74 88.03 77.99 79.79 68.57 70.74 98.33 56.13 94.02
2003
1. Target 
realisation
% time in 
target 0.00 66.67 0.00 87.50 0.00 16.67 91.67 75.00 100.00
Dev. 
from 
target
4.32 66.69 17.80 65.14 34.45 66.30 75.28 85.37 85.62
2. Past inflation 69.49 92.44 91.51 65.96 78.41 69.37 100.00 0.00 100.00
3. Transparency 88.91 93.83 82.50 80.69 74.77 75.43 100.00 78.19 98.11
4. Independence 62.62 82.08 93.92 86.23 93.92 92.85 97.77 85.15 77.46
5. Accountability 100.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
6. Public debt 73.90 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 80.75 100.00
INDEX 63.86 84.32 73.57 80.37 71.72 74.70 96.46 70.29 94.28
2004
1. Target 
realisation
% time in 
target 50.00 16.67 75.00 50.00 41.67 50.00 0.00 100.00 100.00
Dev. 
from 
target
57.79 42.57 75.54 20.36 50.40 80.06 44.80 100.00 72.59
2. Past inflation 54.94 93.59 97.80 74.84 94.87 75.27 97.99 0.00 100.00
3. Transparency 88.91 96.97 93.83 80.69 83.12 75.43 100.00 78.19 98.11
4. Independence 62.62 82.08 93.92 86.23 93.92 92.85 97.77 85.15 77.46
5. Accountability 100.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
6. Public debt 86.53 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INDEX 73.11 77.97 89.00 74.06 81.29 80.18 84.51 76.95 93.05
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Table continued
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U
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2005
1. Target 
realisation
% time in 
target 100.00 91.67 33.33 100.00 50.00 33.33 0.00 100.00 100.00
Dev. 
from 
target
30.33 78.33 54.83 84.36 62.50 67.12 46.72 100.00 89.62
2. Past inflation 55.28 97.99 100.00 79.16 98.35 74.41 100.00 0.00 100.00
3. Transparency 86.64 96.97 93.83 86.98 83.12 79.97 100.00 67.61 98.11
4. Independence 62.62 82.08 93.92 86.23 93.92 92.85 97.77 85.15 77.46
5. Accountability 100.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
6. Public debt 81.61 100.00 100.00 95.75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INDEX 74.22 89.24 83.45 85.96 83.82 77.93 85.04 75.31 94.66
2006
1. Target 
realisation
% time in 
target 100.00 83.33 75.00 66.67 16.67 0.00 83.33 33.33 100.00
Dev. 
from 
target
85.89 67.60 80.89 48.73 48.87 53.24 73.75 31.41 84.05
2. Past inflation 59.04 98.33 100.00 83.50 99.44 76.62 100.00 25.37 100.00
3. Transparency 88.91 96.97 93.83 90.12 87.65 79.97 100.00 89.28 98.11
4. Independence 62.62 82.08 93.92 86.23 93.92 92.85 97.77 85.15 77.46
5. Accountability 100.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
6. Public debt 86.26 100.00 100.00 85.25 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INDEX 81.19 87.48 89.88 79.06 80.25 73.82 95.52 70.13 94.14
2007
1. Target 
realisation
% time in 
target 100.00 58.33 58.33 50.00 83.33 75.00 83.33 50.00 91.67
Dev. 
from 
target
65.05 62.26 67.32 9.11 78.11 77.58 84.38 34.10 81.95
2. Past inflation 79.31 98.13 98.88 85.69 100.00 84.83 100.00 53.74 100.00
3. Transparency 84.37 100.00 93.83 91.07 93.94 75.57 100.00 89.28 99.06
4. Independence 62.62 82.08 93.92 86.23 93.92 92.85 97.77 85.15 77.46
5. Accountability 100.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
6. Public debt 100.00 100.00 100.00 82.50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
INDEX 84.01 85.04 86.82 73.82 90.43 83.97 96.53 76.79 93.29
Source: Own calculations.
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APPENDIX 2
Coeffi cient on the infl ation target in equation (9) (at the end of each year)
Financial analysts
Brazil Chile CR Hungary Poland Slovakia Turkey 
2001 – – – – 0.76 – –
2002 –0.04 – 0.43 – 0.84 – –
2003 –0.15 – 0.87 – 0.85 0.87 –
2004 0.72 0.81 0.95 1.46 0.82 0.85 1.04
2005 0.86 0.81 0.90 0.38 0.90 0.91 0.74
2006 0.85 0.82 0.84 0.03 0.81 0.74 0.75
2007 0.75 0.84 0.79 0.74 0.84 0.74 0.21
Consumers
CR Hungary Poland Slovakia Sweden UK
2001 0.10 – –0.20 – 0.62 –
2002 0.07 – –0.26 – 0.78 0.98
2003 –0.08 – –0.07 0.14 0.91 0.45
2004 0.00 0.28 –0.01 0.05 0.87 0.25
2005 –0.07 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.79 0.50
2006 –0.02 –0.26 0.06 –0.10 0.78 0.03
2007 –0.13 –0.05 0.07 0.23 0.65 –0.07
Source: Own calculations.
Coeffi cient on the infl ation target in equation (10) (at the end of each year)
Financial analysts
Brazil Chile CR Hungary Poland Slovakia Turkey 
2001 – – – – 0.95 – –
2002 – – 0.40 – 0.94 – –
2003 0.74 – 0.81 – 0.86 0.86 –
2004 0.74 0.80 0.83 0.74 0.85 0.81 0.75
2005 0.77 0.80 0.86 0.72 0.90 0.88 0.64
2006 0.80 0.81 0.74 0.79 0.84 0.67 0.71
2007 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.89 0.80 0.59 0.54
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Consumers
CR Hungary Poland Slovakia Sweden UK
2001 0.03 – –0.25 – 0.62 –
2002 –0.11 – –0.24 – 0.74 –0.77
2003 –0.03 – –0.10 0.36 0.67 0.80
2004 0.00 –0.23 –0.03 0.16 0.84 0.43
2005 –0.02 –0.32 0.08 0.10 0.80 0.86
2006 –0.16 –0.37 0.09 0.10 0.80 0.03
2007 –0.22 –0.41 0.05 0.36 0.73 0.87
Source: Own calculations.
